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#2A-4/15/83 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT'OF THE CITY OF^NEW^ORK; 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6129 
FRED GREENBERG. 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on the motion of Donald J. 
Barnett to intervene in this matter. The charge, which was 
filed by Fred Greenberg against the Board of Education of the 
City School District of the City of New York, was dismissed 
by a hearing officer and Greenberg has filed exceptions to 
the hearing officer's decision. We find that intervention at 
this stage of the proceeding would serve no useful purpose. 
Board - U-6129 
ACCORDINGLY, WE ORDER that the motion herein be, and it 
1/ hereby is, denied, 
DATED: April 15, 1983 
Albany. New York 
f^cu / d ^ u ^ -
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randle 
I/Barnett is, however, hereby granted permission to 
file a memorandum of law amicus curiae. It will be 
considered if filed and served not later than May 2, 1983 
At his request, his papers in support of his motion to 
intervene will be considered as his memorandum amicus 
curiae. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
' #2B-4/15/83 
In the Matter of BOARD DECISION 
COUNTY OF NASSAU. AND ORDER 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6414 
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE COUNTY OF 
NASSAU, INC. 
Charging Party. 
EDWARD G. McCABE and BEE & DeANGELIS. ESQS. (PETER B. 
BEE. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
AXELROD. CORNACHIO & FAMIGHETTI. ESQS. (MICHAEL C. 
AXELROD, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the Police Department 
of the County of Nassau, Inc. (PBA) to a decision of a 
hearing officer dismissing its charge that the County of 
Nassau (County) unilaterally changed existing "internal 
investigation" procedures. The alleged change was that the 
County reversed a practice of permitting unit employees who 
are witnesses to be accompanied by an attorney or other 
representative when appearing at an internal investigation. 
The hearing officer found that the subject matter of the 
charge was covered by the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement. He concluded that the agreement reflected the 
fact that the parties had fully negotiated the matter and 
that the action of the County had to be either consistent 
Board - U-6414 
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with or in violation of that agreement. The determination 
whether the County's action was consistent with or in violation 
of the agreement is, according to the hearing officer, not a 
proper question to be presented to this Board because §205.5(d) 
of the Taylor Law provides: 
the board shall not have authority to enforce an 
agreement between an employer and an employee 
organization and shall not exercise jurisdiction 
over an alleged violation of such an agreement 
that would not otherwise constitute an improper 
employer or employee organization practice. 
The hearing officer based his decision upon contract 
language setting forth procedures for internal disciplinary 
investigations. He also found material a related continuation-
of-benefits clause which provides that "disciplinary procedures 
shall be the same as are presently in effect . . . ." 
In support of its exceptions. PBA argues that, since the 
collective bargaining agreement is silent on the specific matter 
covered by the County's unilateral action that allegedly changed 
a past practice, the County was barred by §209-a.l(d) of the 
Taylor Law from taking such action.— 
i/PBA also makes additional arguments. It asserts that 
grievance arbitration would not be a sufficient remedy 
because it is too time-consuming. It also asserts that, if a 
witness appears unaccompanied and subsequently becomes an 
"employee under investigation", his prior appearance as a 
witness might prejudice his subsequent rights as an employee 
under investigation. The first of these arguments is 
irrelevant to the basis of the hearing officer's decision. 
The second argument supports the hearing officer's position 
that the contractual provisions which explicitly protect 
employees under investigation should be dispositive of the 
underlying issue raised by the charge. 
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Having reviewed the record, we affirm the decision of 
the hearing officer. Although the detailed contract 
provisions do not specify the rights of witnesses in internal 
investigations, the above-quoted language of the continuation 
of benefits clause relates directly to the maintenance of 
disciplinary procedures. The charge alleges a change in 
disciplinary procedures. Indeed, in its brief in support of 
its exceptions, PBA describes the County's conduct as a 
change of a long-standing practice and argues that the change 
"superseded the contract". 
We determine that the absence of a contractual provision 
explicitly granting or denying witnesses the right to be 
accompanied by a representative at an internal investigation 
does not reflect a failure of the parties' agreement to cover 
the matter. The agreement covers disciplinary procedures in 
a comprehensive manner and thus may reasonably be found to 
manifest the parties' intention to embrace this particular 
aspect of the broad subject matter negotiated. It is the 
agreement that must be interpreted to determine whether the 
parties intended to afford such a right to witnesses. 
Accordingly, we affirm the hearing officer's conclusion that 
the resolution of this question is not properly presented to 
this Board. 
1233 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: April 15. 1983 
Albany. New York 
^ l£la*^-
Ida K l a u s . Member 
v>A«<rS 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF #2c-4/15/83 
NIAGARA FALLS. 
Employer. 
-and- CASE^NO. C-Z 5 57 
NON-INSTRUCTIONAL ADMINISTRATORS AND 
SUPERVISORS. 
Petitioner. 
VINCENT LORETTO. for Employer 
JAMES D. ADAMS. PETER J. SCIARRINO and ROBERT 
POWELL, for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City 
School District of the City of Niagara Falls (District) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) that the Non-Instructional 
Administrators and Supervisors (NIAS) is entitled to be 
certified as the exclusive negotiating agent of a unit of 
administrative and supervisory employees of the District. 
The unit was defined by the District and NIAS on February 3. 
1983, when they jointly executed a consent agreement which 
specified the job titles to be included in and excluded from 
it. One week later NIAS submitted proof that each employee 
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in the stipulated unit indicated his choice of NIAS as the 
representative of the unit and. on that basis, the Director 
determined that NIAS satisfied the requirements for 
certification without an election. 
The District now argues that, notwithstanding its 
execution of the consent agreement, the negotiating unit is 
not appropriate. In support of this argument, it alleges 
that four of the unit positions are held by employees who 
perform managerial functions. NIAS consents to the deletion 
of one of the positions from the unit, but opposes the 
deletion of the others. 
The District has stated no valid basis, and there is 
none, for our now considering allegations, first made by the 
District only after the Director issued his decision in this 
matter, that some of the employees in the agreed upon unit 
perform managerial functions. Nothing in the Taylor Law 
precludes the granting of representation rights to such 
employees. They may be removed from a unit and be deprived 
of representation rights only if their employer makes a 
timely application and persuasive showing to this Board that 
they should be disqualified.- Even then, managerial 
i/See §201.7(a) of the Taylor Law and §210.10 of the 
Rules of this Board. 
Board - C-2537 
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employees may not be immediately disqualified from 
2/ 
representation rights.— 
Inasmuch as certification of a negotiating unit 
containing employees performing managerial functions does not 
violate the Taylor Law. there would have to be a compelling 
reason for entertaining the District's exceptions and 
reopening the record to determine whether some of the 
employees are managerial. The District has presented none. 
It has neither claimed that it has become aware of newly 
discovered relevant evidence nor asserted any other valid 
basis for withdrawing its consent to the unit. The District 
obviously knew the functions of its administrative and 
supervisory employees when it executed the consent 
agreement. It had conducted informal negotiations with the 
group of employees holding the positions in the negotiating 
unit for over twelve years. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the 
3/ Director.— and 
2/§201.7(a) of the Taylor Law provides that the 
designation of employees as managerial, and hence their 
disqualification from representation rights, shall only 
become effective upon the termination of the period of 
unchallenged representation of the employee organization 
which represents them. 
1/lf, at an appropriate time, the District still 
wishes to exclude some of the employees in the unit defined 
by the Director on the ground that they are managerial 
employees, it may file an application under §201.10 of our 
Rules. 
J 
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WE HEREBY CERTIFY that Non-Instructional Administrators 
and Supervisors has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the District in the unit 
described below as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and for the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Director of School Planning, Operation and 
Maintenance; Data Processing Manager; Civil 
Service Personnel Administrator; Director 
of School Lunch; Supervisor. Maintenance; 
Supervising Custodian; Transportation 
Specialist; Foreman, A/V; Foreman, 
Maintenance; Purchasing Agent; and 
Electrician.4-/ 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER IT IS ORDERED that the District shall negotiate 
collectively with Non-Instructional Administrators and 
Supervisors with regard to the terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the unit found appropriate, 
and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administrationjaf:'.' 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: April 15. 1983 
Albany. New York 
&$-#~ >C^k^<-^— 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randies. Member 
i/ln accordance with an agreement between the 
parties, the position of Jr. Accountant/Treasurer, which 
had been included in the unit by the Director, is excluded, 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SACHEM CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT and #2D-4/15/83 
SACHEM CENTRAL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
Respondents. 
-and- CASE' NOV U-574:4 
RICHARD W. GLASHEEN. 
Charging Party. 
INGERMAN. SMITH. GREENBERG & GROSS. ESQS. (JOHN H. 
GROSS. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Sachem Central School 
District 
KAPLOWITZ & GALINSON. ESQS. (DANIEL GALINSON. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Sachem Central Teachers Association 
RICHARD GLASHEEN. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Richard W. 
Glasheen to a hearing officer's decision dismissing his 
charge containing separate allegations complaining about the 
conduct of the Sachem Central School District (District) and 
the Sachem Central Teachers Association (Association). With 
respect to the District, the allegations state that it denied 
Glasheen tenure because he filed a grievance in June 1980 and 
that it improperly delayed the arbitration of that 
grievance. With respect to the Association, the allegations 
state that it improperly permitted the District to delay 
*-#«tf?Jr<S_/ 
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arbitration.— Among other things, the exceptions argue 
that the hearing officer erred in excluding relevant 
testimony. 
The hearing officer dismissed the allegation that 
Glasheen was denied tenure because he filed a grievance on 
the ground that the charge was not filed within four months 
from the time that Glasheen was denied tenure. She found 
that the final determination to deny Glasheen's tenure had 
been made on March 10, 1981. in a formal letter of 
2/ 
notification from the District's superintendent.— which is 
more than four months prior to November 2. 1981, the date 
i^The hearing officer dismissed an allegation that 
the District and the Association acted improperly when they 
entered into an agreement which did not allow a unit 
employee to go to arbitration without the Association's 
consent. The basis of her decision was that such an 
agreement was not improper. There are no exceptions to 
this part of the hearing officer's decision. 
^/The letter stated: 
"I wish to inform you that I shall recommend 
the termination of your services as a 
probationary teacher in Sachem Central Schools 
effective June 30. 1981. 
Such recommendation shall be made to the 
Board of Education at its June 16. 1981 meeting 
to be held at the Waverly Avenue School at 8:00 
P.M. 
I am enclosing a copy of the 'Fair Dismissal 
Procedure' for your information." 
Board - U-5744 page 3 
of the charge. Citing Education Law §3031. Glasheen asked 
for the superintendent's reasons. The superintendent 
responded in a letter dated March 23. 1981. That letter 
ended with a statement "your services will end this June at 
the expiration of your probationary appointment." 
In his exceptions. Glasheen asserts that the charge 
alleging that the District improperly denied him tenure was 
timely filed and states three grounds in support of this 
assertion. First, he argues that the decision not to offer 
him tenure did not become final until the appeal procedures 
under Education Law §3031 had run their course. Second, he 
argues that a decision to deny tenure can only be made after 
the expiration of a teacher's probationary period, which in 
his case would have been before July 1. 1981. Finally, he 
argues that the language of the superintendent's letter of 
March 10. 1981 stating. "I shall recommend the termination 
of your services . . .". was not sufficiently absolute to 
constitute a final determination, as it would have been with 
the word "will". 
We find no merit in Glasheen's position. It is well 
established that the refusal of a superintendent to 
recommend a probationary teacher for tenure "is. by law. a 
final determination as to the probationer's status at the 
end of probation." 13 Education Department Reports, p. 69, 
Board - U-5744 page 4 
3/ 71.— Accordingly, we reject Glasheen's first argument. 
Glasheen's second argument relies upon a 
misunderstanding of Brida v. Ambach. 69 Misc. 2d 900 (Albany 
Co.. 1972). That case holds only that a teacher cannot gain 
tenure prior to the expiration of his probationary period. 
It does not relate to decisions denying tenure during the 
probationary period. 
Finally. Glasheen's argument based upon the distinction 
between "shall" and "will" must also be rejected. Whatever 
fine distinction may be made in the abstract, it is fairly 
clear that the superintendent followed common usage in 
expressing a final decision and that Glasheen understood it 
that way. 
Glasheen also excepts to the hearing officer's finding 
that the slow pace of the resolution of the grievance does 
not evidence improper conduct by either the District or the 
Association. The record shows that the grievance was 
processed through its nonarbitration stages between July 
1/The subseguent enactment of §3031 has not increased 
the power of a Board of Education. Anderson v. Board of 
Education. Yonkers. 38 NY2d 897 (1976). We find that 
Education Law §3031 procedures are at most in the nature of 
motions to reconsider. As such, the denial of such a 
motion does not extend the time during which to file an 
improper practice. See Board of Fire Commissioners. 
Brighton Fire District. 10 PERB ir3091 (1977); West Park 
UFSD. 11 PERB «ir3016 (1978). 
- 82 
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1980 and the end of September of that year. On October 1. 
1980, a member of the Association's grievance committee 
advised Glasheen not to proceed to arbitration, but when 
Glasheen insisted on going forward, the Association filed 
for arbitration two days later. Thereafter, the matter 
proceeded slowly. The delays are attributed to such factors 
as an administrative error on the part of the American 
Arbitration Association, three requests for adjournment by 
the District and one request for adjournment on the part of 
the Association on behalf of Glasheen, who was unavailable. 
Hearings were held on two days and a record of 250 pages was 
made. Glasheen was offered compromise settlements of his 
grievance during this period which were rejected by him. 
On the evidence before us. we affirm the conclusion of 
the hearing officer that neither the District nor the 
Association deliberately stalled the resolution of 
Glasheen's grievance and that the delays were not the result 
of a design to deprive Glasheen of statutorily protected 
rights. 
Glasheen's final exception argues that the hearing 
officer excluded relevant testimony. This refers to the 
hearing officer's exclusion of a proposed exhibit containing 
a grievance other than the one referred to in the charge. 
Glasheen argues that the document should be received in 
evidence because it would indicate animus on the part of the 
District and thereby help him establish the improper 
Board - U-5744 page 6 
motivation for the delays in the processing of the first 
grievance. 
This argument is rejected. It was not error on the part 
of the hearing officer to exclude the document containing the 
formal statement of the grievance itself as it is merely a 
self-serving statement that carries no weight with respect to 
the truth of its allegations. The hearing officer did. 
however, permit Glasheen to testify about the manner in which 
the grievance was processed and he did so. It is that 
testimony which is material to his position. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 15. 1983 
Albany, New York 
t7&-6U /C&^cr t 
Ida K l a u s . Member 
David C. R a n d i e s , Xember 
w*t"x 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2E-4/15/83 
In the Matter of BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. INC.. 
Respondent, 
-and-
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. INC.. 
Respondent, 
-and-
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. INC.. 
Respondent, 
-and-
CHARLES R. IDEN, 
Charging Party. 
CASE NO. U-4775 
CASE NO. U-4983 
CASE NO. U-4991 
BERNARD F. ASHE. ESQ. (IVOR MOSKOWITZ. ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro se 
STUART ROSENFELDT, ESQ.. for Charles R. Iden 
\^c^=rfi 
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The charges herein allege that United University 
Professions, Inc. (UUP) coerced Thomas C. Barry and 
Charles R. Iden. the charging parties, in the exercise of 
their right to refrain from joining or participating in UUP 
by not processing expeditiously the prescribed appellate 
steps of its agency shop refund procedure for 1977-78 and 
1978-79.— The hearing officer found merit in the 
charges, and the matter comes to us on UUP's exceptions to 
that decision. Charging parties have also filed exceptions 
in which they complain that the hearing officer's remedial 
order is inadequate. 
We note, by way of background, that challenges to the 
adequacy of UUP's agency shop refund procedure and the 
expeditiousness of its implementation have been brought to 
this Board in earlier proceedings. In August 1978. we found 
certain aspects of the arbitration step of the procedure to 
be unsatisfactory. UUP (Eson). 11 PERB ir3068 (1978).UUP 
then revised its refund procedure and we accepted the 
revised procedure with the understanding that refund claims 
would be processed "in an expeditious manner." UUP (Eson). 
11 PERB 1P074 (1978).Later. in consideration of the 
difficulties reported by UUP in processing its first refund 
I/Barry filed charges relating to both the 1977-78 and 
1978-79 refunds. Iden's charge relates to the 1978-79 refund 
only. 
8246 
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appeals under its procedure, we determined that January 31, 
1980 would be a realistic date for disposition of all 
appeals from the 1977-78 refund; and we ordered UUP to 
complete the appeals by that date. We ruled that for 
refunds for 1978-79 and thereafter, the appellate steps 
would have to be completed by August 31 of the year 
following the filing of the refund application. UUP (Eson). 
12 PERB ir3093 (1979). Our decision was affirmed by the 
Appellate Division. UUP v. Newman, 77 AD2d 709 (3d Dept., 
1980), 13 PERB ir7010; mot. for lv. to app. den., 51 NY2d 707 
(1980), 13 PERB T7016. 
Barry's first charge now before us (U-4775) alleges 
that UUP did not process expeditiously its refund procedure 
for 1977-78 agency shop fees in that appeals were not 
disposed of until June 6, 1980. His second charge (U-4983) 
alleges that UUP did not complete the appellate steps for 
1978-79 agency shop fees in an expeditious manner by failing 
to dispose of the pending appeals even as late as October 6. 
1980, the date when that charge was filed. Two days later a 
similar charge was filed by Charles R. Iden (U-4991). 
Based upon the evidence before her, the hearing officer 
found that UUP had not completed the appellate steps of its 
refund procedure for 1977-78 and 1978-79 agency shop fees 
until June 6, 1980 and January 24, 1981 respectively. In 
both instances, this was five months beyond the latest 
acceptable date imposed in 12 PERB 1f3093. The hearing 
Board - U-4775. U-4983, U-4991 -4 
officer therefore determined that UUP had violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law in that the appellate steps of 
its refund procedure for 1977-78 and 1978-79 agency shop 
. . 2/ 
fees were not completed in an expeditious manner.— The 
matter now comes to us on the exceptions of UUP and of both 
charging parties. 
In its exceptions UUP argues that although the 
appellate steps of its refund procedure for 1977-78 and 
1978-79 were not completed within the time limits prescribed 
by us in 12 PERB 1P093, the delay was not improper because 
it had acted as expeditiously as possible. It further 
argues that Barry was in part responsible for the lapse of 
time by requesting an adjournment of the hearing, by making 
2/l5 PERB ir4607 (1982). Iden's charge and Barry's two 
charges had also complained that the procedures followed by 
the "neutral" chosen by UUP for the final appellate stage of 
its refund procedure were unfair and unreasonable. In earlier 
decisions dealing with these three charges (14 PERB 1f4592 
[1981], 14 PERB ir4621 [1981], 14 PERB ir4607 [1981]). the 
hearing officer determined that the allegations relating to 
the conduct of the "neutral" did not set forth an improper 
practice because the subject matter was beyond the 
jurisdiction of this Board. She also determined that the 
allegations that UUP took too much time in completing its 
refund procedure did not allege a separate improper practice, 
but might constitute a violation of this Board's order in UUP 
(Eson). 12 PERB ir3093 (1979). We affirmed the hearing 
officer's decisions regarding the conduct of the "neutral" but 
reversed her dismissal of so much of the charges as alleged 
inexpeditious disposition of the agency shop fee refund 
claims. The cases were remanded to her for further 
consideration of this issue. 14 PERB 1P103 (1981), 14 PERB 
1[3099 (1981) and 14 PERB 1P100 (1981). 
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a request for financial reports, by participating in the 
hearing and by filing a brief. 
In their exceptions Barry and Iden complain that the 
hearing officer's decision does not go far enough in that it 
does not declare the refund procedure to be burdensome and 
coercive in various particulars beyond the length of time 
taken. They also urge us to order, as a remedy for UUP's 
violations, that it refund all agency shop fees collected 
from all payers during its 1977-78 and 1978-79 fiscal years. 
Upon full consideration of all the evidence and 
arguments, we must conclude that UUP's failure to complete 
the appellate steps of its refund procedure for 1977-78 
agency shop fees until June 6, 1980 and its failure to 
complete its appellate steps for 1978-79 until January 24. 
1981 constituted inexcusable inordinate delays of months for 
each year in the performance of its. statutory obligations. 
As we noted in UUP (Eson). 12 PERB ir3093 (1979), taking 
account of UUP's difficulty initiating it's refund procedure, 
it was fair and realistic to expect UUP to complete all 
aspects of this procedure by January 31, 1980 for 1977-78 
agency shop fees and by August 31, 1980 for 1978-79 agency 
shop fees. The record affords no basis for now holding 
otherwise. UUP has not shown that it made a serious effort 
to meet the time constraints we imposed. If, as it asserts, 
it experienced unforeseen problems in meeting the time 
; 
89 
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limits set in the earlier case, it has not explained to us 
why it did not so apprise us and seek a further extension of 
time. Moreover, as the hearing officer found, it did not 
inform the "neutral" it chose that this Board had set time 
limits or that expedition was a high priority. The record 
also supports the determination of the hearing officer that 
no responsibility for the delay can be attributed to Barry. 
His conduct, which UUP complains about, was a reasonable 
exercise of his rights under its procedure and did not 
occasion an unforeseeable delay, particularly as his request 
for adjournment was not granted. 
We affirm the hearing officer's decision that UUP's 
failure to complete the appellate steps of its refund 
procedure for 1977-78 and 1978-79 in an expeditious manner 
constitutes a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law. 
The effect of UUP's slow pace in completing its refund 
procedure has been to discourage agency shop fee payers from 
exercising their statutory right to seek refunds. Thus, as 
we held in UUP (Eson). 12 PERB ir3093. supra, the delay has 
the effect of coercing agency shop fee payers in the 
exercise of their right to refrain from becoming members of 
or participating in the affairs of UUP. 
Accordingly, for Barry and Iden. the two applicants who 
filed charges, we order UUP to refund in full their agency 
shop fees for the years covered by their respective 
Board - U-4775. U-4983, U-4991 -7 
charges. We do not agree, however, that UUP should also be 
ordered to refund the agency fee payments it collected from 
all nonmembers for 1977-78 and 1978-79. In reguesting such 
a remedy, charging parties are seeking monetary compensation 
not only for themselves but also for persons who did not 
file a charge and have not claimed that they were 
aggrieved. Under the Taylor Law only an employee 
3/ 
organization acts in a representative capacity;— 
. . . . 4/ 
individual charging parties do not.— When a charge is 
brought by an individual, he alone is made whole for 
monetary losses that he has shown to have suffered as a 
result of the conduct found to be unlawful. The rights of 
other individuals are protected by the issuance of a cease 
5/ 
and desist order preventing future violations.— 
3/see §203 of the Taylor Law 
^Even were the class action concept to exist under the 
Taylor Law. charging parties have not shown that they are 
proper representatives of the class that they seek to 
represent or that they meet any of the criteria generally 
necessary for class action status. Compare CPLR Article 9. 
5/compare UUP (Eson). 12 PERB 1P117 (1979); affirmed UUP 
v. Newman. 80 AD2d 23 (3d Dept.. 1981). 14 PERB T7011, mot. 
for lv. to app. den.. 54 NY2d 611 (1981). 14 PERB T7026. In 
that case our order made the charging party alone whole for 
losses that he suffered in the past. The statutory concern 
for the prevention of future improper practices was reflected 
in that part of our order directing UUP to cease and desist 
from violating such rights in the future. 
~ 8251 
Board - U-4775. U-4983, U-4991 -8 
We have not considered the complaints of Barry and Iden 
that the hearing officer's decision is inadequate in that it 
does not declare the refund procedure to be burdensome and 
coercive in various particulars other than the length of 
time it took to complete that procedure. These complaints 
relate to the conduct of the "neutral" and nave already been 
rejected by us at an earlier stage in this proceeding.— 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER UUP: 
1. To refund to Barry the total amount of 
his agency shop fee for 1977-78 with 
interest at the rate of 6 percent per 
annum from March 5, 1979. the date of 
the refund, through June 25, 1981, and 
at the rate of 9 percent per annum 
thereafter: 
2. To refund to Barry and Iden the total 
amount of their agency shop fees for 
1978-79 with interest at the rate of 6 
percent per annum from February 26. 
1980, the date of the refund, through 
June 25. 1981. and at the rate of 9 
percent per annum thereafter. 
i>/see footnote 2. 
Board - U-4775. U-4983. U-4991 
To post a copy of the notice attached 
hereto on all bulletin boards regularly 
used by it to communicate with unit 
7/ 
employees.— 
DATED: April 15. 1983 
Albany. New York 
^ MA***-
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randies, Membedc 
Z/ordinarily we would order UUP to complete the 
appellate steps of its agency shop fee refund procedure 
expeditiously. Such an order would be redundant here because 
of the order already issued by us in UUP (Eson). 12 PERB 
1f3093, supra. 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
._._._ PUBLIC^EMPLOYMENX RELATIONS,BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all unit employees that United University Professions will: 
1. Refund to Thomas C. Barry the total amount of his agency shop fee 
for 1977-78 with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum from 
Marcy 5, 1979, the date of the refund, through June 25, 1981, and 
at the rate of 9 percent per annum thereafter. 
2. Refund to Thomas C. Barry and Charles R. Iden the total amount of 
their agency shop fees for 1978-79 with interest at the rate of 6 
percent per annum from February 26, 1980, the date of the refund, 
through June 25, 1981, and at the rate of 9 percent per annum 
thereafter. 
United University Professions 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF HARPERSFIELD, 
-and-
Employer. 
AMALGAMATED INDUSTRIAL UNION. LOCAL 
76B-92-76. UFWA. AFL/CIO. 
Petitioner. 
#3A-4/15/83 
CASE NO. C-2575 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the.Amalgamated Industrial 
Union. Local 76B-92-76. UFWA. AFL/CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Town Highway Department 
employees employed by the Town of 
Harpersfield 
Excluded: Town Highway Superintendent 
&UzJ 
Certification - C-2575 page 2 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Amalgamated Industrial 
Union, Local 76B-92-76, UFWA, AFL/CIO and enter into a written 
agreement with such employee organization with regard to terms 
and conditions of employment of the employees in the unit found 
appropriate, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of, 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: April 15. 1983 
Albany, New York 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #3B-4/15/83 
ROOSEVELT PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2514 
ROOSEVELT PUBLIC LIBRARY STAFF 
ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Roosevelt Public Library 
Staff Association has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full and part-time employees 
in the following titles: 
Librarian. Children's Librarian, 
Clerk, Senior Library Clerk. 
Account Clerk, Clerk Typist, 
Custodian. 
mm 
Certification - C-2514 page 2 
Excluded: Director of Library, Pages, CETA 
employees and all other employees 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Roosevelt Public Library 
Staff Association and enter into a;'"'written agreement with" such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the unit found appropriate, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of, and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: April 15. 1983 
Albany, New York 
StL^/d^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
"^-"i>vJ? 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND. 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE. INC.. 
Petitioner.. 
-and-
ROCKLAND COUNTY LOCAL 844. CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. INC.. 
Intervener. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police. 
Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named employer, in the unit described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Criminal Investigator. Senior 
Criminal Investigator. 
Criminal Investigator -
Electronic Surveillance. 
#3C-4/15/83 
CASE NO. C-2454 
Certification - C-2454 page 2 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of 
Police, Inc. and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the unit found appropriate, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of, and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: April 15, 1983 
Albany, New York 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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